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CONCEPTIONS OF LEGAL "THEORY":

A Response To Ronald Dworkin
Richard A. Posner*

The editors have kindly invited Professor Sunstein and me to
comment on Ronald Dworkin's article In Praise of Theory.' The article is
critical of what Dworkin calls the "Chicago School" of "anti-theorists," 2 to
which he has consigned both Sunstein and me despite the palpable
differences between our views.
I do not want to paper over those
differences, but I do want to point out that Dworkin has committed the
identical error in his criticisms of both of us, as well as mischaracterizing
our views. That error is to announce a parochial definition of "theory," then
define anyone who does not subscribe to it as an "anti-theorist." I shall
explain this error and argue that it deforms Dworkin's analysis of my own
conception of theory and that his own conception is inadequate as a guide for
judges or others engaged in practical legal tasks.

I.
Dworkin's idea of "theory," specifically of the kind that should
guide judges faced with difficult cases, requires that judges "justify legal
claims by showing that principles that support those claims also offer the best
justification of more general legal practice in the doctrinal area in which the
case arises. "3 The best (or better) justification is the one that "fits the legal
practice better, and puts it in a better light." 4 In determining fit, the judge
may find himself swept up in a process that Dworkin calls "justificatory
*
Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and Senior Lecturer,
University of Chicago Law School. I am indebted to Neil Duxbury, Lawrence Lessig, Martha
Nussbaum, David Strauss, and Cass Sunstein for many helpful comments on a previous draft of this

response.
1.
Ronald Dworkin, In Praiseof Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353 (1997).

2.
3.
4.

Roughly two-thirds of Dworkin's article is devoted to the "Chicago School."
Dworkin, supra note 1, at 355-56.
Id. at 356.
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ascent." 5 The judge finds himself challenged to consider how the
justification that he has seized upon coheres with ever broader swatches of
legal doctrine as questions are raised about its consistency with this or that
legal-or moral-rule or principle. The concept of justificatory ascent is
Dworkin's acknowledgment that judges more often reason upward from
particular cases and arguments than downward from an overarching
principle-such as egalitarianism, or utilitarianism, or Mill's conception of
liberty-that makes the whole body of the law consistent. But he insists that
through justificatory ascent a judge may be lofted to a high level of
generality. So Cardozo, he says, "felt that [justificatory ascent was]
necessary in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., and he changed the character
of our law. "6 "[Liegal reasoning presupposes a vast domain of justification,
including very abstract principles of political morality," and we must always
be prepared "to reexamine some part of the structure from time to time...
,7 If judges are, as in our system, given the task of interpreting a
constitution, they will have to undertake "a very considerable 'excursion'
9
into political morality" g or, equivalently, a "deep expedition into theory."
10
"
"ostrich.
an
is
issues
philosophical
The judge who refuses to confront
What Dworkin claims to be describing is not one theoretical
approach among many, but "theory," so that Sunstein and I, who do not
subscribe to Dworkin's conception of how judges should decide cases, are
members of "the anti-theory army," along with "the post-modernists, the
pre-structuralists, the deconstructionists, the critical legal students, the
critical race scholars, and a thousand other battalions" of that army."
Dworkin says that my battalion of the antitheory army is that of the
antimetaphysicians and pragmatic instrumentalists, and Sunstein's that of the
"professionalists. "12
The labeling of his critics and antagonists as antitheorists is not a
new tactic for Dworkin. His polemic against Robert Bork accused Bork, an
5.
Id. at 357.
6.
Id. at 358 (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916)). A
curious example, as Cardozo's opinion does not explain the overarching principle in light of which
privity should no longer be required for products liability (the holding of the case). The opinion is
notable for its ingenious (or disingenuous) manipulation of precedent rather than for frank
confrontation of the issues of principle or policy that the case raised. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 8-27 (1949); RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO:
IN REPUTATION 107-09 (1990).
7.
Dworkin, supra note 1, at 360.

8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.
ld. at 371.
Id. at 375.
Id. at 361.

12.

Id.
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influential although controversial constitutional theorist, of lacking "any
constitutional philosophy at all. . . .[H]e believes he has no responsibility to
treat the Constitution as an integrated structure of moral and political
Dworkin equates theory to philosophy to treating the
principles ... .
entire Constitution, and through justificatory ascent the entire body of
American law, as "an integrated structure of moral and political
principles." 14 Anyone with a more modest conception of the role of
constitutional interpretation is not a theorist.
This is persuasive definition with a vengeance. Far from bearing
only the meaning upon which Dworkin insists, "theory" is a word with no
fixed or definite meaning, at least in normative discourse.
Scientists,
including social scientists (or at least economists), generally understand by
"theory" an abstract, logically consistent model of causal relationships,
applicable to some domain of physical reality or social practice, from which
hypotheses can be deduced that can be confirmed or refuted (in some
versions only refuted) with objective data generated by experimental or other
systematic observation. The successes of the natural sciences have induced
practitioners of other disciplines to describe their own work as "theory."
Yet what should count as, say, a moral or a legal theory, or more precisely
what these terms exclude, is completely unsettled. Some moral theories have
the approximate form of the scientist's hypothetico-deductive conception of
theory. They set forth and defend a logical model that has implications for
specific moral issues, and they use the moral intuitions of the theorist, or of
the theorist's moral community, as the data to confirm or refute the
hypotheses. Some moral theorists insist that even our most deeply intuitive
moral principles should, if necessary, be changed to conform to the theory.
A typical legal theory is far more modest-a mere generalization that is
claimed to subsume the leading cases in a particular field or subfield of law.
More ambitious legal theories, such as Bork's theory of free speech that
Dworkin found insufficiently theoretical, use principles drawn from other
fields of discourse, such as economics or political theory, as criteria for
evaluating specific legal doctrines and decisions. Some degree of generality
or abstraction, and an insistence on consistency, are the bedrock
requirements of "theory." Beyond this it does not seem possible to specify
preconditions for what is to count as a moral or a legal theory.

13.
Ronald Dworkin, The Bork Nomination, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Aug. 13, 1987, at 3, 10,
reprinted as RONALD DWORKIN, Bork: The Senate's Responsibility, in FREEDOM'S LAW: THE
MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 265, 267, 273 (1996).
14. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 13, at 273.
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Were this all that Dworkin meant by "theory"-an effort to achieve
consistency and generality-he could not accuse Bork of lacking a
constitutional theory, or Sunstein and me of being antitheorists. By "theory"
Dworkin means his own, highly specific conception of legal theory. This
conception is in the line of descent15 from Wechsler's influential article on
"neutral principles, " 16 which in turn has affinities to the "legal process"
7
school and to natural law, to both of which Dworkin has fairly direct links,'
and on the side of philosophy to the approach of Kant (as refined by Rawls),
as contrasted with that of Aristotle. The heart of Dworkin's conception, as
earlier the conception of legal theory held by.Wechsler and by Hart and
Sacks, is the imposition of master themes, such as democratic legitimacy, or
federalism, or relative institutional competence, or equality, on the
particulars of the law. The professors propose, and the judges impose"integrating" the Constitution, for example. That is why justificatory ascent
is so important; it is the only way the judge who does not start with a master
theme can end up with one.
Justificatory ascent should not be confused with induction. After the
judge has reached the top, he kicks away the ladder. He accepts, by being
forced to climb the ladder, that he cannot decide the case without adopting a
master principle, but once it is adopted it decides the case. The top-down
quality of the approach is shown by its practitioners' lack of serious,
sustained interest in legal particulars from either a doctrinal or an empirical
standpoint. As illustrated by the Philosophers' Brief that so strikingly fails to
engage the many difficult institutional issues raised by its proposal of a
constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide,' 8 there is little texture to
15. See David A. Strauss, Principle and Its Perils, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 376-81 (1997)
(review of Dworkin's book Freedom's Law, supra note 13). "In nearly every respect, Dworkin's
'moral reading' [of the Constitution] was anticipated by the scholars of the late 1950s and early
1960s." Id. at 376.
16.

Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1

(1959).
17.

See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205-299 (1995); LLOYD

L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 119-21 (1987); Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the
Legal Process Tradition: The Legacy of Hart and Sacks, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 413 (1987); see also
Ronald A. Dworkin, "Natural Law" Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982). The classic of the
legal process school is Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tentative ed. 1958) (published in 1994 with

an introduction by William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Philip P. Frickey).
18. See Brief for Ronald Dworkin et al. as Amici Curiae, Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.
Ct. 2258 (1997) [hereinafter Dworkin, .Brief], reprintedas Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide:
The Philosophers' Brief, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 27, 1997, at 41 [hereinafter Dworkin,
Assisted Suicide]. The brief lists Dworkin as the lead counsel for the philosophers (Rawls and
others, as well as Dworkin himself) who are the amici. Regarding the question whether a right to
physician-assisted suicide might in practice result in involuntary deaths, the brief is content to argue
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Dworkin's analysis of legal issues, just as there was little texture to Hart and
Sacks', or to Wechsler's. Dworkin operates with "ideal types" (in Weber's
sense) of affirmative action, pornography, and abortion, just as Hart and
Sacks operated with ideal types of the court, the legislature, and the
administrative agency, and Wechsler with an ideal type of apartheid, in
which the harm to blacks from being prevented from associating with whites
is exactly balanced by the harm to whites from being forced (if apartheid
were prohibited) to associate with blacks. Dworkin's principles are different
but the approach is the same, except that Dworkin evinces even less interest
than Hart and Sacks or Wechsler in how a legal system actually works, in
the practical capacities and political constraints of judges,1 9 in the text and
history of particular enactments, in the difference between holding and dicta
(and hence in the scope of particular precedents), in the data and theories of
the social sciences that relate to the issues that arise in the legal cases that
interest him, or in the effects of legal rules. Dworkin's is one possible way
of "doing" law, but it is not the only way that can claim to be theoretical or
theorized.
II.
Thus, Dworkin's major claim, that because Sunstein and I do not
share his approach to law we are antitheorists, fails; but his specific
objections to our positions have still to be considered. Professor Sunstein
can fend for himself, so in the remainder of this reply I shall confine myself
to Dworkin's criticisms of me. He believes that I am a relativist and
that "the case law contains no suggestion that such protocols [for example, requiring two
nonattending physicians to agree] are inevitably insufficient to prevent deaths that should have been
prevented." Dworkin, Brief, supra, at *14; Dworkin, Assisted Suicide, supra, at 45. The adequacy
of case law to resolve such an issue is not discussed. The brief contains no references to any
materials other than cases, statutes (one), and law review articles.
The reprint of the brief in the New York Review of Books comes with an introduction by
Dworkin that cites several empirical studies, but they are not cited in the brief itself. Assisted

Suicide, supra, at 41-42. Dworkin at least is a lawyer; the willingness of the other signatories of
the brief, who are not lawyers, to sign a legal brief on a difficult issue of constitutional law is a
striking illustration of philosophers' hubris.

19. How strange of him to say, "I agree with the critics that not all judges are trained in
philosophy." Dworkin, supra note 1, at 375 (emphasis added). I have never met a single judge of
whom it could be said with a straight face that he had been "trained in philosophy." It is true that
Learned Hand had studied philosophy at Harvard, and Holmes certainly had a philosophical bent;

but these were judges who had been educated in the nineteenth century. The term "trained in
philosophy" would have to be given a very special meaning to be descriptive of such Dworkinian
judicial heroes as Warren, Brennan, and Blackmun, though doubtless some of the law clerks who

ghostwrote the opinions that Dworkin admires had philosophical training.
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(inconsistently) a utilitarian. I am neither. But if I were both (if that were
possible, which it is not), this would not make me an "antitheorist," for
relativism and utilitarianism are themselves theories. It would make me an
anti-Dworkinian, and this can help us see in what a special sense Dworkin
uses the words "theory" and "antitheory."

A.
Dworkin accuses me of flirting with postmodernists who believe
"that there is no objective truth about political morality," that "all our
convictions on these matters-and more fundamental issues, including, for
example, whether genocide is wicked . . . -are simply creatures of...
'language games.'" 20 He claims to find this "flirtation" in my book
Overcoming Law. All he cites in support of this claim, however, is a
discussion of pragmatism that concludes that pragmatism "is not
21
epistemological or moral skepticism, or scientific or moral relativism."
Moral relativism, as he uses the term, is the idea that all moral beliefs are
matters of mere "opinion," 22 rather than of right and wrong. This would
mean that if someone said to me that it was okay to torture children, all that I
could say in reply was that I disagreed but that every person is entitled to his
own opinion. That is not my view, though I do not think that the moral
wrongness of the practices that we abhor can be demonstrated by the sort of
procedures that we would use to show that no human being has ever eaten an
elephant at one sitting, or that when rational members of a society disagree
profoundly about the morality of a particular practice, as they do in our
society about abortion, their disagreement can be resolved by arguments that
will prove one side's position "true" and the other's "false." Such issues get
resolved, sometimes by force, sometimes by experience, sometimes by
displacement of interest to new problems, but rarely if ever by argument.
Moral argumentation is too weak an intellectual tool to dislodge moral
convictions.
(Here may be where Dworkin and I crucially disagree.)
Twenty-five years of inconclusive debate about the political morality of antiabortion laws illustrate the limitations of argument in settling moral debate.
This does not show that there are no moral truths, for there are unresolved
scientific debates older than the abortion debate, yet undoubtedly (or so I
20.
Dworkin, supra note 1, at 361.
21. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 10 (1995) (emphasis added); see also id. at 36;
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 77 (1990) [hereinafter POSNER,
JURISPRUDENCE].
22. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 362-63.
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would argue) there are scientific truths. The seeming interminability of the
abortion debate-not only the lack of resolution but the lack of any progress
toward a resolution (I mean an intellectual, not a political, resolution)shows only that either the morality (or immorality) of abortion is not one of
the moral truths or that we lack the tools for determining whether it is one of
them.
That I do not have Dworkin's faith in the cogency of his kind of
moral reasoning does not make me a relativist. Nor does my belief that most
moral truths, unlike scientific truths, are local truths. They are specific to
particular societies, rather than being universal. Often they are specific to
particular constellations of culture-laden facts-a specificity in which
Dworkin, emphatically a "big picture" man, a universalizing rationalist, has
no interest. The same physical act-killing another human being, for
example-may be unquestionably moral in some circumstances and
unquestionably immoral in others.
Abortion is abortion whether the
mother's life is endangered or she just does not want to have another girl
baby, but it does not follow that the morality of abortion is the same in the
two cases. Making slaves of captives when the only alternative would be to
kill them does not have the same moral valence as a system of chattel
slavery. Infanticide has a different moral valence in a society on the edge of
starvation than in one that has the material resources to support all infants.
Dworkin might argue that unless moral principles are universal,
there is no ground for pronouncing a society's practice either moral or
immoral, so that without universal moral principles morality really does
become just a matter of opinion. (This is related, as we are about to see, to
his criticism of pragmatism.) I do not agree. Often it is possible to show
that a society's practice is inconsistent with its premises-the practice might
be to sacrifice virgins in order to prevent drought, and it might be shown
that the sacrifice had no effect on the likelihood of a drought. If this were
shown, and if the society had a norm against the gratuitous slaughter of its
members, and yet it continued the practice even after being forced to admit
that it was inefficacious, the society would be acting immorally. If it turns
out, as I believe it would on examination, that all societies have a norm
against the gratuitous slaughter of their members, this would be a universal
moral norm-an absolute, if one likes the term.
The position that I have sketched is not moral relativism; at least it is
not the position that Dworkin attributes to me, that moral beliefs are entirely
a matter of opinion. Where we surely differ is on whether it is possible to
derive answers to concrete moral issues such as the morality of abortion or
infanticide from moral norms sufficiently abstract to claim universal or
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absolute validity-though I do not deny the political value of appealing to
universal moral values (the "brotherhood of man," for example) as a
bulwark against the kind of aggressive ethnocentrism epitomized by Carl
Schmitt's slogan "all right is the right of a particular Volk."23 I would add
that we distinguish between cultures whose presuppositions are so foreign to
our own that they seem to belong to a different moral community and efforts
of particular societies within our own Western culture to secede from the
moral community, as Germany tried to do in the Nazi era. Even if moral
principles are local, the "localities" within which they bind may be
extensive.
B.
Dworkin's more sustained criticism is of the pragmatic approach to
law, which he considers a rival to "theory," that is, to Dworkin's conception
of theory. He begins by claiming for his own conception what I had
described as the pragmatic virtues.
He challenges the statement in
Overcoming Law that "the adjectives that . . . characterize the pragmatic

outlook-practical, instrumental, forward-looking, activist, empirical,
skeptical, antidogmatic, experimental-are not the ones that leap to mind
when one considers [Dworkin's] work." 24 He discusses two of these
adjectives-"forward-looking" and "experimental"-embracing the first and
implying that the others (all but "experimental") describe his work as aptly
as that of any pragmatist.
This is a surprise. Dworkin an "activist"? His critics might
describe him as one, but his own view is that judges who refuse to do law 2in5
the grand Dworkinian manner are the lawless ones, the activists.
Empirical? That is not the impression conveyed by the Philosophers' Brief
or the discussions in Dworkin's books and articles of abortion, affirmative
6
action,
civil Instrumental?
disobedience, defamation,
the environment.
Practical?
Skeptical? pornography,2
Antidogmatic? and
Dworkin
is a high
23.
Quoted without an indication of its source in Mark Lilla, The Enemy of Liberalism, N.Y.
REV. OF BOOKS, May 15, 1997, at 38.
24. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 21, at 11. Dworkin modestly omits the next

sentence: "Not that his work does not have many virtues, but they are not those picked out by my
list." Id. I Was not trying to be polite. I consider Dworkin's work to have great merit, see, e.g.,
RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA vii, 10-20, 36-37

(1996), and his position as our leading living philosopher of law to be deserved.
25.

See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 21, at 22-23.

26.

He has, however, glanced at the empirical question of whether pornography incites

violence against women.
n.4.

See DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 13, at 375 nn.20-21, 378
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rationalist with (as it seems to me27) a weak sense of fact; not one of these
terms fits him.
1. About "forward-looking," Dworkin says that if it means
"consequential," then his approach is forward-looking because "[i]t aims at a
structure of law and.community that is egalitarian" ;28 only if "forwardlooking" is equated to.utilitarian is he not forward-looking. But the term is
not used in Overcoming Law to denote either consequentialism or
utilitarianism. It is used to contrast an approach, the pragmatic, that aspires
to make things better for the present and the future and cares about the past
only insofar as the past provides guidance to the present and the future, with
an approach that values the past for its own sake-as in "the past must be
allowed some special power of its own in court, contrary to the pragmatist's
claim that it must not.", This is neither consequential nor forward-looking.
I do not mean that Dworkin is unconcerned with consequences. But
he is less concerned with them than I am. Although he denies that
pornography contributes to crime or to discrimination against women, he
would give much less weight than I would to any bad consequences of
pornography even if they could be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
because he attaches great importance to the nonconsequential principle that
people ought to be allowed to read what they please, which to me is simply
one value to be weighed against others. For him, the fact that government
"insults its citizens, and denies their moral responsibility, when it decrees
that they cannot be trusted to hear opinions that might persuade them to
dangerous or offensive convictions " is a far more important justification for
free speech (including the right to read pornography) than any instrumental
justification that might be offered.
2. With regard to my suggestion that he is not "experimental,"
Dworkin says that I must mean that he rejects the idea that "[1]awyers and
judges should try different solutions to the problems they face to see which
work, without regard to which are recommended or endorsed by some grand
theory."31 This is restated a bit later as the judge is "not to worry about
what is really true but just to see what works. " 32 This is said to be useless
advice if the question the judge has to decide is whether to hold drug
companies in DES cases liable for the harm done by their defective product
27.
POSNER,
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 376-77 (1981); see also
OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 21, at 187-88.
Dworkin, supra note 1, at 364.
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 167 (1986).
DWORKIN, Why Must Speech be Free?, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 13, at 200.
Dworkin, supra note 1, at 366.

Id.
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even if it cannot be determined which drug company's DES pills were taken
by which plaintiff's mother; 33 or if the question for the judge is whether
abortion should be forbidden. The advice to experiment is useless in these
cases, Dworkin argues, because judges would have no standard for what
counts as "working," and thus for evaluating the results of the experiment,
unless they thought through the underlying issues, such as collective versus
individual responsibility for harms, or the human status of the fetus.
He is right that judges need rules or standards to guide them; but I
had not denied this in commending experimentalism. I had said that the
pragmatist "is drawn to the experimental scientist, whom [the pragmatist]
urges us to emulate by asking, whenever a disagreement arises: What
practical, palpable, observable difference does it make to us?" 34 Scientific
experimentation does not proceed in a theoretical vacuum. The quoted
passage is advising judges and other legal thinkers not to become entangled
in disputes that have no practical significance, disputes such as whether
judges "make" or "find" law. It is not recommending the creation of rules
of law by trial and error. To attempt to decide cases without a sense of what
the purpose of the applicable law is-and so in the DES cases without asking
whether the deterrent and compensatory objectives of tort law would be
served by collective responsibility in the circumstances of irremediable
uncertainty presented by those cases-would be unpragmatic.
Yet the example of abortion shows that even the trial and error
version of experimentalism has a legitimate place in the legal process-so
here is another place where there is more than a semantic disagreement
between Dworkin and me. A telling criticism of Roe v. Wade is that the
Supreme Court prematurely nationalized the issue of abortion rights. Had
the Court either ducked the issue completely or based the decision on a
narrow ground (such as that the Texas law at issue did not contain enough
exceptions), the states would have been free to experiment with different
approaches to the abortion question and eventually an answer might have
emerged that would have commended itself to the Court, and the nation, as
both principled and practical. It is to such a possibility, with its undoubted
element of trial and error, that Dworkin the antipragmatist is blind; and the
blindness impoverishes his theory.

33. As in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), holding that in such a
case the court should apportion liability among the manufacturers in proportion to their market
shares when the drug was sold, that is, in accordance with the probability
manufacturer's pills were the ones taken by the plaintiff's mother.
34. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 21, at 7.
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III.

I said earlier that Dworkin's was one way of doing law. But it is not
the best way. It is too abstract for a case-based legal system. It might do
better in a regime of "abstract review" such as one finds in the constitutional
courts of central Europe and occasionally in U.S. state supreme courts.
Courts do abstract review when they determine the constitutionality of
statutes before the statutes are applied-before there is a case in other words.
The strength of the case system is its sensitivity to the particulars of a
specific legal dispute. Attention to them at once educates the judges and
deflects them from overgeneralization. The weakness of the case system is
that the education is incomplete because the "facts" revealed by the record of
a lawsuit are often inaccurate and rarely systematic. But the cure is not high
theory. The theory to which Dworkinians ascend on their justificatory
ladders is too abstract to decide cases. What judges mainly need is a better
understanding of the practical consequences of their decisions. I also agree
with Sunstein that a lot of theoretical disagreement in law can be elided by a
search for low-lying common ground.3 5 I add only that common ground is
easier to find if the judges know the practical stakes of their decision. Most
Americans, including most American judges, are pragmatists rather than
ideologues, but to come up with pragmatic solutions they have to understand
the empirical dimensions of the legal disputes that come before them for
resolution. The well-known differences between male and female judges in
their assessment of cases of sexual harassment are not due to theoretical
differences. These judges are neither male chauvinists nor radical feminists.
Their differences stem from different perceptions of the incidence and the
psychological and other effects of such harassment.
It also helps in doing law to know a great deal of law rather than just
a handful of exemplary cases. Law is like a language. It is as difficult to
write well about law at the operating level without an intimate knowledge of
it as it is to write well about China without knowing Chinese. It is no
criticism of our most distinguished philosopher of law (save as he wishes to
be more) that his legal palette is meager. Rarely does Dworkin venture
outside the highly politicized domain of constitutional rights, and when he
does the results are unimpressive. I mentioned his peculiar discussion of the
MacPherson decision. 36 His article returns again and again to the DES
cases, finally asking challengingly, "Should the judge try to decide whether
35.

See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35-61 (1996)

("Incompletely Theorized Agreements"); see also his reply to Dworkin in this issue, Cass R.
Sunstein, From Theory to Practice,29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 389 (1997).
36. See supra note 6.
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the drug manufacturers are jointly liable without asking whether it is fair,
according to standards embedded in our tradition, to impose liability in the
absence of any causal connection?" 37 Any genuine legal insider would
consider this a strange question, and not only because the issue was not joint
liability in the technical legal sense of the term.38 We regularly impose
criminal liability-for example, for failed attempts that cause no harm, or
conspiracies nipped in the bud, or schemes to defraud that do not defraud
anybody, or "victimless" crimes that cannot be shown to cause any harm, or
drunk driving where no accident results-without worrying about the
absence of a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the
harm that the law is trying to prevent. In the law of torts, liability is
standardly imposed on negligent persons whose acts are merely sufficient
and not necessary conditions of harm and so do not fit the usual definitions
of cause; is usually imposed on employers of the persons who cause the
harm of which the plaintiff is complaining (under the doctrine of respondeat
superior); is sometimes imposed on persons who merely fail to avert a harm
(as in "crashworthy" products liability cases and cases of attempted but
failed rescue); is imposed on persons who conspire with injurers; is imposed
on the estates, that is, the heirs, of injurers; and is sometimes imposed (as in
"loss of a chance" cases) on an injurer despite the victim's inability to prove
causation by a preponderance of the evidence. The question whether it is
"fair" to impose liability on a manufacturer of DES who cannot be shown to
be the actual "cause" of the plaintiff's injury is thus naive. It is also
unhelpful. It will not move us an inch closer to the intelligent evaluation of
these cases.
I do not want to be thought a philistine judge, just as I do not want to
be thought a postmodernist antitheorist. Apart from my obvious partiality to
economic theory, I do not deny that philosophy can be helpful in clarifying
certain legal issues, such as intent and, yes, causation.39 But to think that it
can be helpful by telling us to reflect on the fairness of imposing liability
without proof of causation is to reveal an ignorance of the relevant terrain
and the thinness-the essentially rhetorical character-of Dworkin's
invocation of "theory."

37.
38.

Dworkin, supra note 1, at 371.
Joint liability would mean that all the drug companies were fully liable for all DES

injuries. The issue resolved in favor of the plaintiffs in the Sindell case was whether the liability of
each company should be proportioned to its market share. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936-37.
39. See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 21, at 168-84 (intent), 324-25 (causation).
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